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Videoconferencing in Immigration Proceedings
AARON HAAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
When there is mention of a legal trial, a certain picture naturally comes
to mind.  One sees a judge in his black robe sitting on a raised bench.
Lawyers are stationed at tables on either side of the courtroom, prepared to
present their arguments to the court.  A jury box may sit off to the side,
holding a cross-section of citizens culled from the population to perform
their ancient duty.  The courtroom is made of fine wood and polished mar-
ble, and it is adorned with the accouterments of justice—American flags,
seals, paintings of honored jurists—which let an observer know that he sits
in a hall where important decisions are made and grave judgments are ren-
dered.
Many people may be surprised to witness an immigration hearing in
present-day America, where important decisions are also made and grave
judgments are also rendered, but which has an altogether different and less
impressive appearance.  Observers are likely to see a small room located
deep within a large federal building, with two tables perpendicular to one
another, connected to form a right angle.  A lawyer sits at each table, one
representing the government and the other an alien.  A row of chairs, be-
hind these tables and against the walls, seat the family and friends of the
alien.  On the other side of the room, in view of the advocates and observ-
ers, is a television screen with a camera on top.  This screen shows the
judge on one side, who may be located in another state, and the alien on
the other side, who is seated in a detention center in a third location.
As courts struggle to balance large caseloads and limited resources,
they have increasingly turned to technological solutions.  Videoconfer-
encing, in particular, has become a popular tool in judicial proceedings in
the last decade.  It has found its way into state, federal, and administrative
courts.  In 1996, Congress allowed videoconferencing in immigration re-
moval proceedings, and the Department of Homeland Security has steadily
expanded the number of such proceedings conducted remotely through
videoconferencing technology.  The government believes that these pro-
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ceedings are more efficient, less time-consuming, and more secure than
traditional in-person hearings.
Last summer, for example, one of these proceedings was conducted by
videoconference in Cleveland, Ohio.1  The lawyers were located in the
federal building in downtown Cleveland, which was the official venue for
the trial.  The respondent was in a detention facility in Orient, Ohio, a few
hours drive from the courtroom.  The judge was seated in Arlington, Vir-
ginia.
The respondent was a native of Nigeria, but was a legal permanent
resident of the United States.  He plead guilty to charges related to the rob-
bery of thirty dollars from an individual and was ordered removed from the
country on the grounds that he had committed an aggravated felony.  The
respondent appealed the ruling, asking for a stay of his removal order un-
der the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and argued it was probable that
he would be tortured if he was removed to Nigeria.  The respondent ex-
plained that he was a member of a tribe that had opposed the ruling gov-
ernment, and that his father had been a prominent opponent of the govern-
ment.  He had been tortured three times in the past in Nigeria and feared he
would be tortured again if deported there.
Observers could feel the way the videoconferencing technology medi-
ated the interaction and communication between the judge and the respon-
dent, subtly but significantly affecting the conduct of the hearing, the re-
spondent’s ability to present his case before the court, and ultimately the
verdict itself.  Arguably, the turning point in the proceeding came during
an important exchange between the respondent and the judge.  The judge
asked the respondent if he committed the robbery to which he plead guilty.
The respondent tried to explain that he had not personally committed the
robbery, but was part of a group of men, one of whom had committed this
robbery.  He plead guilty, he said, as part of a deal with prosecutors to
avoid prison time, unaware at the time of the implications on his immigra-
tion status.  As the respondent began his explanation, the judge cut him off
mid-sentence and understood him to say that he was not taking responsi-
bility for the crimes to which he plead guilty.
The miscommunication between the judge and the respondent was
partly due to the respondent’s lack of fluency in English, but was also
caused by time delays in speech recognition inherent to the medium of
videocommunication, as well as by the inability to clearly see visual cues
of recognition and understanding, or lack thereof.  Immediately after this
exchange, the judge took a more negative view of the respondent and his
claims, and the judge ultimately ruled against the respondent on the CAT
 1. The author observed this proceeding, which was unpublished.
2006 VIDEOCONFERENCING IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 61
claim and ordered him deported.  It is impossible to know to what extent
the use of videoconference technology affected the outcome of this case, or
the many others like it.  But, perhaps surprisingly, this issue has not re-
ceived the amount of attention it deserves.
Proceedings conducted by videoconference raise a number of concerns
that have not yet been fully explored, particularly in light of a growing
body of scientific evidence that shows video-mediated personal interac-
tions are perceived as significantly different by the participants and ob-
servers than in-person interactions.  Recent behavioral and psychological
studies have found that key differences between the two forms of commu-
nication—the lack of eye contact and the difficulty of detecting nonverbal
cues—have profound impacts on the cognitive and emotional response of
the listener and the perception of the speaker’s credibility and guilt.  Per-
sonal testimony is particularly important in the immigration removal con-
text because respondents often lack the resources to provide evidence and
witnesses.  These proceedings violate a number of important rights that are
fundamental to our conception of justice: the right to be present in court;
the right to personally confront the witnesses and evidence against you;
and the right to effective representation by an attorney.
Part II of this article surveys the growing use of videoconferencing
technology in American courts, including immigration proceedings.  Part
III examines the problems raised by the use of this new technology in the
courtroom, specifically with regard to its impact on communication be-
tween the respondent and the judge.  Next, Part IV shows how these prob-
lems violate the detainee’s fundamental rights to presence, confrontation,
and counsel.  Finally, Part V presents recommendations to mitigate these
problems while still taking advantage of new technology.  Part V also pro-
vides examples of effective uses of videoconferencing.
When a resident is deported to his home country, it can have devastat-
ing consequences on his and others’ lives.  Deportation can lead to the loss
of work and livelihood, to the breakup of families, to torture and abuse in
an unfriendly land, and to the denial of medical or social care.  When we
bring new technology into the courtroom in the name of efficiency, we
must be careful to examine its impact on the legal process and the admini-
stration of justice.  Videoconferencing technology has greatly expanded in
immigration hearings in recent years, with little consideration into its
larger systemic impact.  This article attempts to correct that imbalance by
raising questions about a quiet revolution occurring in immigration hear-
ings, and by encouraging others to look more carefully at how our system
of justice is evolving in surprising and perhaps unintended ways.
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II. VIDEOCONFERENCING IN THE COURTROOM
A videoconference is comprised of a set of interactive telecommunica-
tion technologies, which allow two or more locations to interact via two-
way video and audio transmissions simultaneously.2  The core technology
used in a videoconference system is digital compression of audio and video
streams in real time.3  The resulting digital stream of 1s and 0s is divided
into packets and then transmitted through a video network.4  A courtroom
will typically use a dedicated videoconference system, which includes a
multi-purpose console with a remote-controlled video camera on top.
Omni directional microphones, a television monitor, and loudspeakers are
connected to the console.
As the technology has developed and become more affordable, and as
high-speed Internet connections have become ubiquitous, videoconferenc-
ing has gained popularity in a number of fields.  It is commonly used in
business, education, medical diagnosis and consulting, and personal com-
munication through cheap web cams and software-based videoconferenc-
ing technology.5  Not surprisingly, a movement to use this technology in
courtrooms began in the hope that it would improve the efficiency of the
administration of justice.
While no criminal trial has been conducted by videoconference, it has
been used in other aspects of the criminal trial process: arraignments, bail,
sentencing, and post-conviction hearings.  An Illinois court first used video
technology to conduct bail hearings in 1972 over videophone.6  A Phila-
delphia court began using closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) for prelimi-
nary arraignments in 1974.7  Dade County, Florida, began using videocon-
ferencing for misdemeanor arraignments in 1983.8  Videoconferencing has
also been used to take the testimony of child witnesses in sexual abuse
cases because it shields them from being in the presence of the accused
abuser during their testimony.  Videoconferencing has also been used in
civil trials, where the constitutional guarantees are not as strict as criminal
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, EOIR’S VIDEO
CONFERENCING INITIATIVE FACT SHEET 1 (Sept. 21, 2004), http:// www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/ VCFact-
SheetSep04.pdf [hereinafter EOIR’S VC FACT SHEET].
 3. Id.
 4. Id.
 5. See generally Nancy Gertner, Videoconferencing: Learning Through Screens, 12 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 769 (2004) (discussing use of videoconferencing).
 6. Videoconferencing, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS.: BRIEFING PAPERS (Nat’l Center for St. Cts.,
Williamsburg, Va.) 1995, at 2.
 7. Id.
 8. Id. at 3.
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proceedings, such as civil commitment hearings, workers’ compensation
hearings, and social security appeals.9
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Removal Act, which, among other things, amended the Immigration
and Nationality Act to allow removal proceedings to be conducted
“through videoconference.”10  Currently, videoconferencing equipment has
been installed at the headquarters of the Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EOIR), as well as forty immigration courts across the country,
and seventy-seven other facilities, including detention centers and correc-
tional facilities, where immigration hearings are conducted.11
Court administrators consider this technology to benefit the efficient
administration of justice and have enthusiastically supported its continua-
tion and expansion.  The EOIR contends that this “alternative communica-
tions resource is beneficial to both the immigration courts and the alien
respondent in immigration proceedings” because it saves travel time for
immigration judges, promotes effective case management, lightens heavy
case loads,  provides for more expedient hearings, reduces travel costs, and
improves safety and security.12
A report from the Institute for Court Management at the National
Center for State Courts was also strongly supportive of this new technol-
ogy.13  It argued that videoconferencing technology would make law en-
forcement personnel more useful, improve court security, reduce witness
and interpreter costs, improve productivity of judges and the court system,
improve access to courts, and have other collateral benefits.14
Immigration attorneys, however, have been less sanguine about this
new method of conducting hearings.  Peggy Gleason, an attorney at the
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, writes that she has encountered
many problems at these hearings.15  Because there typically are no court
officials at the detention center, the judge relies on the prison guards to
assist the court.  Interpreters are often in separate locations from the re-
spondent, making translation more difficult and less accurate.  It is hard to
make eye contact and communicate through body language.  Frequent
 9. Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Constitutional and Statutory Validity of Judicial Videoconferenc-
ing, 115 A.L.R. 5TH 509 (2004).
 10. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).
 11. EOIR’S VC FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 2.
 12. Id.
 13. Michael G. Neimon, Can Interactive Video Work in Waukesha County? An Analysis and Survey,
NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS.: RES. PAPER (Nat’l Center for St. Cts., Williamsburg, Va.) May 2001, at
3.
 14. Id.
 15. Peggy Gleason, Reality TV for Immigrants: Representing Clients in Video Conference Hearings,
5 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 732 (2000).
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equipment difficulties and poor sound quality make it harder to hear and
understand respondents, who often speak English poorly.  There are prob-
lems with the use and presentation of evidence, and with serving notice
and other important documents to the detainee.  Gleason found the video
trial to be a “surreal experience” in which her client was turned into a
“piece of electronic equipment.”16  She urged other immigration attorneys
to object to these types of hearings and to make special preparations with
their clients for the peculiar difficulties incidental to them.17
Despite these kinds of protests from attorneys, videoconference trials
appear to be a growing trend in immigration jurisprudence.  This phe-
nomenon has occurred largely unnoticed outside the world of immigration
law and largely unstudied as to its effects on due process and justice.
Some findings in media theory and behavioral psychology raise important
questions about how implementing videoconferencing technology into the
courtroom may be damaging the delivery of justice to our nation’s immi-
grants.
III. PROBLEMS WITH VIDEOCONFERENCE TRIALS
A.  The Medium is the Message
In 1964, an obscure Canadian literature professor, Marshall McLuhan,
published a book called Understanding Media: The Extension of Man.18  It
was a meditation on the impact of modern media on society summed up
with the phrase, “The medium is the message.”19  He became an instant
celebrity and was invited to speak on television programs and at corporate
gatherings.  Tom Wolfe, writing in New York magazine, asked, “Suppose
he is what he sounds like: the most important thinker since Newton, Dar-
win, Freud, Einstein, and Pavlov?  What if he is right?”20  Timothy Leary
said McLuhan inspired him to come up with the phrase, “Turn on, Tune in,
Drop out.”21  He even appeared in Woody Allen’s Annie Hall, to rebut a
pretentious professor’s claim to understand his work.22  But, his celebrity
 16. Id.
 17. Id.
 18. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSION OF MAN (1964).
 19. Id. at 7.
 20. Tom Wolfe, Marshall McLuhan: Suppose He is What He Sounds Like, the Most Important
Thinker since Newton, Darwin, Freud, Einstein and Pavlov—What if He is Right?, in MCLUHAN HOT
AND COOL: A PRIMER FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF AND A CRITICAL SYMPOSIUM WITH A REBUTTAL
BY MCLUHAN 15 (Gerald Emanuel Steam ed., 1967).
 21. MCLUHAN, supra note 18, at 5.
 22. ANNIE HALL (MGM 1977).
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died down and his writings were largely ignored in the 1980s, until the
Internet and the Information Age—a term he coined—gave his writings a
whole new meaning and prescience.
Writing in the 1960s, McLuhan predicted that electronic media would
break down the boundaries of time and space to create a kind of “global
village,” in which combined media would enable people from all over the
world to share the same experiences.  He wrote, “Today, after more than a
century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous sys-
tem itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our
planet is concerned.”23
This prediction of the social impact of digital media and the Internet
decades before their appearance is remarkable and has revived his popu-
larity among media scholars.  In 1994, Lewis Lapham, the editor of
Harper’s Magazine, commented,
The world that McLuhan describes has taken shape during my own
lifetime . . . .  His prescience is extraordinary, and the events of the
last thirty years have proved him more often right than wrong.  His
hypothesis anticipates by two decades the dissolution of interna-
tional frontiers and the collapse of the Cold War.24
Wired, one of the leading new media magazines, dubbed McLuhan its
“patron saint.”25
The core concept behind his belief that “the medium is the message” is
that the form of communication is more important, in terms of its effect on
the recipient, than the content of the message.26  He believed that people
wrongly focused on the visible elements of communication, when in fact,
the more significant impact came from those aspects of the communication
medium that unconsciously shape and control the human response.
By way of example, he argued that certain performers and leaders,
based on their personalities, were more or less successful communicators
depending on their ability to master the relevant medium.27  It has often
been noted that some actors who were successful in silent films immedi-
ately became less popular with the introduction of sound, and that certain
actors who were very successful on television failed completely when tried
 23. MCLUHAN, supra note 18, at 3.
 24. Lewis H. Lapham, Introduction to MARSHALL MCLUHAN: UNDERSTANDING MEDIA ix, xv-xix
(MIT Press 1994) (1964).
 25. See, e.g., Noah Schachtman, Honoring Wired’s Patron Saint, WIRED (May 13, 2002) (“Nearly
ten years ago, Wired anointed media theorist Marshall McLuhan the magazine’s ‘patron saint.’”).
 26. MCLUHAN, supra note 18, at 7.
 27. Id.
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try to make movies.  Their personalities are well-suited to certain medi-
ums, but not others.
A similar phenomenon can be seen with political leaders.  Ronald
Reagan’s popularity and ability to communicate effectively with the public
is often ascribed to his mastery of the television medium.28  Likewise,
Franklin Roosevelt’s ability to use radio helped him connect with Ameri-
cans during wartime.29
Perhaps the best illustration of the importance of medium on message
is the 1960 debates between presidential candidates Richard Nixon and
John F. Kennedy.  Public opinion polls came to the striking conclusion that
most radio-listeners found Nixon won the debates, while most television
viewers found Kennedy more persuasive.30  McLuhan quotes Philip Deane:
Regardless of the value of Mr. Nixon’s views and principles, he
has been defending them with too much flourish for the TV me-
dium.  Mr. Kennedy . . . presents an image closer to the TV
hero—something like the shy young Sheriff—while Mr. Nixon
with his very dark eyes that tend to stare, with his slicker circum-
locution, has resembled more the railway lawyer who signs leases
that are not in the interests of the folks in the little town.31
Nixon was more suited to the medium of radio, and Kennedy was more
situated to television.  In the television age, the advantage went to Ken-
nedy, and he won the election.
B.  The Media Equation
Disparities like those seen in response to the Nixon-Kennedy debates
can be explained by the different ways in which the audience members
interact with the different media.  With radio, listeners are largely passive
recipients of sound, while television viewers, according to McLuhan, expe-
rience a more complex interaction with the images on the screen that de-
mand a degree of imagination and interpretation.32
 28. See MARY STUCKEY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE MEDIA, IN MEDIA POWER, MEDIA
POLITICS 168 (Mark J. Rozell, ed., 2003).
 29. Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech Curriculum Ignores Elec-
tronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 MO. L. REV. 59, 87 (2005).
 30. Liette Gidlow, The Great Debate: Kennedy, Nixon, and Television in the 1960 Race for the
Presidency, HIST. NOW, Sept. 2004, http://www.historynow.org/09_2004/historian2.html.
 31. MCLUHAN, supra note 18, at 329-30 (quoting Philip Deane, The Sheriff and the Lawyer,
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 15, 1960).
 32. Eric Norden, The Playboy Interview: Marshall McLuhan, PLAYBOY (Mar. 1969), available at
http://www.digitallantern.net/mcluhan/mcluhanplayboy.htm (“The secret of TV’s tactile power is that
the video image is one of low intensity or definition and thus, unlike either photograph or film, offers
no detailed information about specific objects but instead involves the active participation of the
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Indeed, recent research indicates that the interaction between the
viewer and the screen image is so intense that viewers cognitively respond
to screen images as though they are real and unconsciously and unknow-
ingly equate media images with real life.33  Byron Reeves and Clifford
Nass, both professors at Stanford University, contend that most people
believe,
[T]hat the confusion of mediated life and real life is rare and in-
consequential, and it can be corrected with age, education, or
thought.  We have collected a great deal of evidence that shows
this conclusion is not true.  Equating mediated and real life is nei-
ther rare nor unreasonable.  It is very common, it is easy to foster,
it does not depend on fancy media equipment, and thinking will
not make it go away.  The media equation—media equal real
life—applies to everyone, it applies often, and it is highly conse-
quential.34
They continue, “[i]n short, we have found that individuals’ interactions
with computers, television, and new media are fundamentally social and
natural, just like interactions in real life.”35  Because of our unconscious
biases, we treat television images as though they are real.
This equation of mediated images with real life has profound conse-
quences for the present study.  If nonverbal cues are crucial to successful
communication, as is shown below, and if video-mediated communication
(VMC) distorts or diminishes these cues, as is also shown below, the in-
ability of the audience to distinguish between what they are seeing and real
life will lead them to draw different and more negative conclusions about
the individual than they would if he was actually present.  For example, if,
arguendo, eye contact is important to establishing credibility and trust-
worthiness, the inability to make eye contact inherent to the use of VMC
will hurt the respondent’s chances of establishing his credibility and hon-
esty because the viewer fails to realize that the lack of eye contact from the
television imagery is not real.  The viewer will respond to the lack of eye
contact from the image in front of him the same way that he would respond
to lack of eye contact from a person actually in front of him—that is, he
viewer.  The TV image is a mosaic mesh not only of horizontal lines but of millions of tiny dots, of
which the viewer is physiologically able to pick up only 50 or 60 from which he shapes the image; thus
he is constantly filling in vague and blurry images, bringing himself into in-depth involvement with the
screen and acting out a constant creative dialog with the iconoscope.  The contours of the resultant
cartoon-like image are fleshed out within the imagination of the viewer, which necessitates great per-
sonal involvement and participation.”).
 33. See generally BYRON REEVES & CLIFFORD NASS, THE MEDIA EQUATION (1996).
 34. Id. at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
 35. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
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will believe the person is being evasive.  This research reinforces the view
that medium can overtake content in determining message.
Mark Federman, a media scholar at the University of Toronto, argues
that the overemphasis on content, as opposed to the medium itself, extends
in modern times to computer-mediated communications and videoconfer-
encing technologies.36  Federman was asked by the Immigration and Re-
view Board of the Government of Canada to look into how, in light of cur-
rent research in communications and media theory, the use of videoconfer-
ence technology could affect immigration proceedings in Canadian courts.
Federman argued, “The latest approach to media study considers not only
the ‘content’ but the medium and the cultural matrix within which the par-
ticular media operate.”37  He pointed to several factors that could affect
outcomes of immigration cases conducted in this way besides the content
of the testimony:
[T]he relative cultural conditioning of television itself; the partici-
pants’ conditioning relative to video camera’s use in surveillance;
the effects of distortions in experiencing nonverbal communica-
tion, or those induced by shifted eye-contact (through non-
alignment of viewing screen and camera angle); the effects a
video-mediated environment may have on encouraging or detect-
ing deception; and, the effects of the participants’ relative imbal-
ance in experience with videoconferencing, among other secon-
dary and tertiary ground influences.38
This article will next examine how the medium dominates the message
in the case of videoconferencing.  In short, the medium fundamentally al-
ters the nonverbal behavioral cues that are a crucial element of successful
communication.  These distortions make it harder for respondents to estab-
lish trust and credibility, connect emotionally with the judge, develop
positive impressions, and ultimately, convince the judge of the validity of
their arguments.
C.  The Unspoken Dialogue
A group of researchers at the Center for Gesture and Speech Research
at the University of Chicago, led by Professor of Linguistics David
McNeill, wanted to understand the role played by paralanguage—the non-
 36. Mark Federman, On the Media Effects of Immigration and Refugee Board Hearings via Video-
conference, 19 J. REFUGEE STUD. (forthcoming 2006).
 37. Id.
 38. Id.   
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verbal elements of communication—in story-telling.39  Study participants
watched a scene from a Sylvester and Tweety Bird cartoon, in which
Sylvester attempted to reach Tweety Bird by climbing up the inside of a
drain pipe, only to have Tweety Bird drop a bowling ball down the pipe.
Sylvester swallowed the ball, rolled out of the pipe, down the street, into a
bowling alley, and down a lane where he scored a strike.40
The participants were then told to recount the story in their own words.
The researchers watched the gestures and body movements of the partici-
pants used to convey drop, roll, down, and other aspects of the story.  They
found that gestures were not only useful, but essential, to conveying
meaning because the gestures and words worked together to transmit un-
derstanding.  Specifically, they found that meaning only emerges at the
intersection of speech communication and gesture communication, at a
locus they call the growth point (GP).  They found that there are two dis-
tinct modes of representation, one linguistic and the other imaginal, and
each has its own meaning potential.  It is only at the GP where true mean-
ing can emerge because each mode of communication is insufficient in
itself to accurately convey meaning.41
Gesture, however, is in fact just one of many forms of nonverbal
communication humans use to make themselves understood to others.  The
first scientific study of nonverbal communication (NVC) was published by
Charles Darwin in 1872.42  He argued that animals use NVC to express
feelings of anger or pleasure, to communicate between mother and baby,
and to increase social bonds. 43  These animal gestures and expressions
were passed on to humans through natural selection and are still used in
human society today.
Sigmund Freud believed body language and other NVC could reveal
the true feelings that people try to hide.  For example, explaining that
someone who is lying will give his intention away through gestures, Freud
wrote, “If his lips are silent he chatters with his fingertips; betrayal oozes
out of him at every pore.”44 
Since then, many studies have confirmed the crucial role NVC plays in
the way we communicate.  One of the most important scholars in this field
is Albert Mehrabian, a psychologist at UCLA.  After a decade of study, he
 39. David McNeill, Catchments and Contexts: Non-Modular Factors in Speech and Gesture Pro-
duction, in LANGUAGE AND GESTURE 312 (David McNeill ed., 2000).
 40. Id. at 314.
 41. Id. at 312-24 (detailing the study).
 42. CHARLES DARWIN, THE EXPRESSION OF THE EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS (1872).
 43. See generally  CHARLES DARWIN, THE EXPRESSION OF THE EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS
(1872).
 44. Sigmund Freud, Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, in 7 THE STANDARD EDITION
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 77-78 (J. Strachey ed., 1905).
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came to two conclusions.  First, he found that communication consists of
three elements: words, tone of voice, and body language.45  Second, he
found that, with regard to the communication of feelings and emotions, the
relative importance of these elements in conveying meaning could be
summed up by the 7-38-55 percent rule.46  That is, words account for seven
percent of meaning, tone of voice for thirty-eight percent, and body lan-
guage for fifty-five percent.  For meaningful communication, these differ-
ent elements need to support each other.  If they appear to be in conflict,
the element with the higher importance is taken as the correct one.  In other
words, if a speaker’s words appear to conflict with his body language, the
audience believes that the body language accurately portrayed the
speaker’s feelings and that the words are inaccurate.47
NVC can emanate from different parts of the body and take many dif-
ferent forms.  One of the most important ways we communicate nonver-
bally is through facial expressions.  Studies have shown that there are eight
distinct positions for the brow and forehead, seventeen for eyes and lids,
and forty-five for the lower face.48  Each single feature or combination of
features on these parts of the face can express different emotions.  Happi-
ness, for example, is shown when the corners of the mouth are drawn back
and slightly up, by wrinkle lines from the nose to the corners of the mouth,
by raised cheeks, and by wrinkles outward from the outer corners of the
eyes and below the lower eyelids.49  Fear and sadness, on the other hand,
can only be decoded from the eyes and lids.50
The hands are another rich source of expression.  One group of re-
searchers showed a film of a woman speaking, with the first group of
viewers seeing her face and hand movements, and the second group seeing
only her face.51  The first group found the woman cheerful and friendly,
while the second group found the same woman, absent the hand move-
ments, tense and disturbed.52  Researchers have found that anxiety, for
example, is indicated by the interlocking of hands or the opening and
closing of fists, while elation is demonstrated by fast, rhythmical hand
movements.53
The examples are too numerous to iterate here, but it is well-
established that emotions can be expressed through voice pitch, eye gaze,
 45. ALBERT MEHRABIAN, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 178 (1972).
 46. Id. at 179.
 47. Id.
 48. MICHAEL ARGYLE, BODILY COMMUNICATION 122-31 (2d ed. 1988).
 49. Id. at 125.
 50. Id.
 51. Id. at 197.
 52. Id.
 53. Id. at 200.
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posture, touching of hair, and many other nonverbal signals and gestures.
If paralanguage is indeed crucial to communication, and the video medium
distorts the messages given by these signals and gestures, it would be a
powerful demonstration of communicative form overwhelming content.
To discover whether this is the case, we must look to the use of videocon-
ferencing in legal proceedings.
D.  Videoconferencing Justice: The Experience So Far
Unfortunately, because videoconferencing technology is new and has
not been used in ordinary criminal trials, there have been few studies ex-
amining the effects of these kinds of trials as they are actually experienced.
One of the first and most important uses of this technology in the court-
room is children’s testimony during sexual abuse cases.  A major concern
in these trials is that it would be too painful or traumatic for children to
testify in a courtroom where they come face-to-face with their alleged
abuser.  Studies conducted on child testimony in sexual abuse trials in
Australia54 and New Zealand55 are generally positive.  These studies, how-
ever, were not particularly comprehensive and were understandably in-
fused with the overriding concern of protecting the children from further
anxiety and trauma.
In the 1970s, as videotaped testimony began to enter American court-
rooms, two groups of researchers tried to determine what effect, if any, this
new technology would have on trial outcomes.  The teams—one at Michi-
gan State University (Michigan State) and the other at Brigham Young
University (BYU)—found little differences between live and videotaped
testimony.56  The studies, however, suffered from a number of problems.
Gordon Bermant, a psychologist at the University of Washington
speaking at a symposium entitled The Use of Videotape in the Courtroom,
pointed out four criticisms the scientific community would have with the
methodologies employed in the Michigan State and BYU studies.57  First,
noting that there appeared to be great variation within the realm of video
trials and live testimony, he found that permissible changes in technique or
circumstance would make the comparisons too general.58  Second, he
found that they failed to establish a null hypothesis: a condition in which
 54. Judy Cashmore, THE USE OF CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION FOR CHILD WITNESSES (1992).
 55. Lynne Whitney & Angela Cook, THE USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION IN NEW ZEALAND
COURTS (1990).
 56. Gerald Miller & Norman Fontes, REAL VERSUS REEL: WHAT’S THE VERDICT? (1978).
 57. Gordon Bermant, Critique – Data in Search of Theory in Search of Policy: Behavioral Re-
sponses to Video in the Courtroom, 1975 BYU L. REV. 467, 470 (1975).
 58. Id.
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there are no differences to be found among the conditions being compared
other than the variable being tested.59  Third, the investigators lacked a
theoretical framework in which to discover meaning from their results.60
Finally, the studies worked on only one level of analysis, failing to look at
the broader implications and second-order effects of an introduction of new
technology in such a setting.61
A more recent study of simulated child witness testimony found a
meaningful difference between live and videotaped presentations.  This
study presented mock sexual abuse trials in two formats: one in which the
child witness testified in open court, and one in which his testimony ap-
peared on videotape.62  The author found that the child’s testimony was
more believable and powerful when presented live.63  Consequently, there
was a higher conviction rate of the accused when the child testified live.
Specifically, the conviction rate was 60.8 percent in the trials with video-
taped testimony and 76.6 percent when the child appeared in person.64
Taken together, the few studies looking at real or simulated courtroom
impact of VMC are not comprehensive or conclusive enough to draw
strong conclusions.  As a result, it is necessary to look at scientific studies
that, though less informative than actual experience, provide the best win-
dow into the impact of this technology in the courtroom.  The scientific
studies show that videoconferencing diminishes and distorts NVC, leading
to a loss of both emotional connection and perceived credibility, and ulti-
mately, to less favorable verdicts.
E.  The Loss of Nonverbal Cues to Meaning
One of the most important judgments juries must make is about the
credibility of the witnesses.  In immigration hearings, which often involve
few witnesses and little evidence, the perceived credibility of the respon-
dent is often decisive to the outcome of the case.  Evidence indicates that
juries make frequent use of nonverbal cues in assessing witness credibility,
and that these nonverbal cues are not effectively transmitted over video.
In one study, 131 undergraduates at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst acted as members of a jury in a trial in which the defendant had
been accused of assault and petty larceny.  The defendant would serve
 59. Id. at 470-71.
 60. Id. at 471-72.
 61. Id. at 472.
 62. David F. Ross et al., The Impact of Protective Shields and Videotape Testimony on Conviction
Rates in a Simulated Trial of Child Sexual Abuse, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 556-58, 561-62 (1994)
(describing experimental conditions).
 63. Id. at 562.
 64. Id. at 563.
2006 VIDEOCONFERENCING IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 73
three years in state prison if convicted.  Some groups of jurors watched
videotapes of simulated defendants’ testimony.  The testimony involved
the defendant’s supposed alibi and was designed to be sufficiently vague to
support either a guilty or innocent judgment.  The verbal testimony was the
same in each instance, but sometimes the defendant displayed behaviors
indicative of deception and other times his behavior was neutral.  Other
groups of jurors simply read a transcript of the testimony.65
The jury members were instructed to rate the defendants’ believability
on a seven point scale, with seven being most believable and one being
least believable.  Significant differences were seen between the defendants.
Whereas the transcript received an average 3.76 rating and the neutral de-
fendant a 3.48 rating, the defendant showing nonverbal deception cues
received a 2.39.  These results indicate that nonverbal behavior is an im-
portant factor used by juries in determining the reliability and truthfulness
of a defendant’s testimony.66
These important nonverbal signals are not transmitted as successfully
over videoconference equipment as when the communicators are present in
the same room.  In one important study, investigators compared group
communication to complete a task through three different media: audio
only, audio and video, and face-to-face.67  Seventy-two students from the
University of Nottingham were organized into pairs and instructed to com-
plete a map orienteering task in each of the three different contexts.  The
researchers found that the amount of verbal dialogue needed to complete
the task was significantly greater over video than in the face-to-face con-
text.  This result indicates that video-mediated interaction does not effec-
tively transmit the nonverbal signals that are important to successful com-
munication.68
The finding in the University of Nottingham study—that NVC is not as
rich over videoconference as in a live setting—is confirmed by further
studies.  One such investigation occurred at an engineering school, where a
class was being conducted via videoconference between three different
sites—one at the main campus with the professor present and two at re-
 65. Robert S. Feldman & Richard B. Chesley, Who is Lying, Who is Not: An Attributional Analysis
of the Effects of Nonverbal Behavior on Judgments of Defendants Believability, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
451, 454-56 (1984) (describing experimental conditions).
 66. Id. at 456-58 (describing experimental results).
 67. Gwyneth Doherty-Sneddon et al., Face-to-Face and Video-Mediated Communication: A Com-
parison of Dialogue Structure and Task Performance,  3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 105,
110-23 (1997)
 68. Id.
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mote sites.69  Students were organized into seven project teams of about
four students each and asked to rate their classmates.70
The researchers found that the participants made use of different kinds
of information in forming their impressions of remote others in comparison
to face-to-face others.  Specifically, face-to-face communicators were able
to make more nuanced judgments of peers, based on more kinds of infor-
mation than they could with remote colleagues.71  The study also showed
that the impressions people formed of remote others were different from,
and less positive than, those they formed of face-to-face others.72  As the
weeks of the course went on, people increasingly had positive impressions
of and wanted to work with peers who were in the same room as them, and
decreasingly had positive impressions of and wanted to work less with
classmates in remote settings.73  These results indicate that VMC both de-
grades the richness of human communication and diminishes the ability to
generate positive feelings among participants.74
F.  Forming Impressions and Connecting Emotionally
The finding in the engineering school study—that VMC produces
more negative impressions of speakers than live interaction—has been
demonstrated in the courtroom setting as well.  A recent dissertation re-
ported a study that compared the effects on jury perceptions of child wit-
nesses in sex abuse cases of live testimony versus testimony via CCTV.75
The author recruited mock jurors from the community and had child actors
testify either via CCTV or live.
The author found that children who testified via CCTV, all else being
equal, were viewed more negatively by jurors than those testifying live.
Specifically, those children testifying on CCTV were viewed by jurors as
less believable, less accurate for both the prosecution and defense, less
accurate in recalling past events, more likely to have made up the story,
less honest, less able to testify based on fact rather than fantasy, less at-
tractive, less intelligent, less consistent, and less confident.  Unsurpris-
 69. John Storck & Lee Sproull, Through a Glass Darkly: Why Do People Learn in Videoconfer-
ences?, 22 HUM. COMM. RES. 197, 202-05 (1995).
 70. Id.
 71. Id. at 200.
 72. Id. at 209.
 73. Id.
 74. Id. at 206-10.
 75. Holly Kay Orcutt, Detecting Deception: Factfinders’ Abilities to Assess the Truth (1998) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo) (on file with author).
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ingly, jurors were more likely to find the accused abuser guilty when chil-
dren testified live rather than via CCTV before deliberation.76
An important factor in the more negative impressions formed by vid-
eoconference communication, in comparison to live interaction, may be the
greater difficulty viewers have in feeling close to speakers on the other end
of a television screen or computer.  The ability to connect with the judge
and win his empathy is often crucial to immigrants who must rely on their
personal story to win their case.  This task is made harder by the use of
mediating technology.
In one study, sixty-four undergraduates at Iowa State University were
randomly assigned to either a face-to-face or online conversation.77  Par-
ticipants in the face-to-face condition reported more self-disclosure and
greater satisfaction, levels of closeness, and recall of facts immediately
following the interaction.  Students in the in-person setting rated them-
selves and their partners more sharply—higher positive reactions and
lower negative reactions—on scales of emotional reaction to the conversa-
tion, indicating that the individuals in the face-to-face condition were ei-
ther experiencing more affect or had more information to rate higher levels
of affect.  The authors concluded that relationships develop more quickly
and achieve greater degrees of comfort and openness when face-to-face.
These findings indicate that emotionally charged interactions, like a re-
spondent’s testimony about torture abuse, will be more forthcoming and
better understood when conducted face-to-face, rather than filtered through
media.78
G.  The Loss of Trust
In addition to losing an emotional connection, the respondent suffers
from a loss of trust and credibility as a result of the technological barrier
between himself and the judge.  In one study, a series of elaborately staged
mock child abuse trials were held.79  Children participated in a play session
with an unfamiliar male, and later, individually testified about the experi-
 76. Id.  Interestingly, these biases were wiped out during deliberation, therefore, the ultimate verdict
was not affected by the choice of testimony delivery.  It should be remembered, however, that immi-
gration hearings are conducted by judges as the sole deciders, so the apparently salutary effects of
deliberation may not be relevant in the context of such hearings.
 77. Michael J. Mallen et al., Online Versus Face-to-Face Conversations: An Examination of Rela-
tional and Discourse Variables, 40 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES., PRAC., TRAINING 155 (2003).
 78. Id.
 79. Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit Technology on
Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 173-81 (1998)
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ence at a local court.  Mock juries observed the testimony either live or via
CCTV and rated the witnesses.80
The study found that CCTV biased jurors against child witnesses.
Specifically, children who testified via CCTV were viewed as less believ-
able than children who testified in regular trials.  They were also viewed as
more likely to be making up their story and less likely to be basing their
testimony on fact rather than fiction.81
This loss of trust may result from the absence of eye contact inherent
in video-mediated communication.  People view willingness to make eye
contact as an important indicator of trustworthiness.  Videoconferencing,
however, typically cannot achieve this effect because the camera is located
apart from the monitor, such that a person looking into the monitor will
appear, from the camera’s angle, to be avoiding eye contact.  Typical vid-
eoconferencing equipment places the camera either directly above the
screen, directly below the screen, or to a side of it.  It has been found that
the vertical or horizontal loss of eye contact associated with these camera
placements results in a perceived loss of trust.  Eye contact is only per-
ceived when the conversation partner looks directly into the camera, but
this is rarely the case due to the placement of the camera and the inexperi-
ence most users have with this technology.  It is fair to assume that most
respondents in immigration proceedings have little or no experience with
videoconference technology, and therefore would not know where to look
and how to position themselves to maximize their perceived credibility.82
The tendency of video-mediated facial and body language to under-
mine credibility is exacerbated by the fact that viewers rely more on such
nonverbal signals when interacting via videoconference.  They rely more
on NVC in this context because the diminution of interaction makes it
harder to understand the verbal communication.  One recent dissertation
found that VMC led to less understanding of the verbal communication,
greater reliance on NVC, and a reduction in the speaker’s credibility and
persuasive effectiveness.83
For this dissertation, the author conducted a field study of lectures at a
hospital on different medical topics given by different speakers, some live
and some via videoconference.84  The author found that the videoconfer-
ence presentations demanded more cognitive work from audience mem-
 80. Id.
 81. Id. at 189-97.
 82. Teko Jan Ernst Bekkering, Visual Angle in Videoconferencing (2004) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Mississippi State University) (on file with author).
 83. Carlos Ferran-Urdaneta, The Effects of Videoconferencing on Persuasion (2000) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University) (on file with author).
 84. Id.
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bers, who therefore relied on peripheral cues, like body movements and
eye contact, rather than systematic processing of the argument itself.85  The
greater cognitive effort demanded from VMC could lead a judge to miss
key aspects of the respondent’s argument or to rely less on the argument
itself than other, less objective factors.86  If immigrants are seen as less
honest and credible when appearing via videoconference, and if inferior
cognitive understanding on the part of the judge leads to an over-reliance
on these factors, it hurts their ability to make their case, and makes it more
likely that they will lose at trial.
H.  Technical Problems
The problems with videoconference are often made worse by technical
difficulties with the videoconference equipment, which appear to be fairly
common at these proceedings.  Such technical difficulties only serve to
exacerbate the effects mentioned above by making the audio and video
worse in quality and a greater barrier than usual between the respondent
and the judge.  The most comprehensive study on this problem was con-
ducted by the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago in 2004.87
During the summer and fall of that year, researchers observed 110 vid-
eoconference hearings at the immigration court in Chicago.  They found
problems with nearly forty-five percent of the proceedings they observed,
ranging from technical problems, to interpretation problems, to problems
with access to counsel.  Fully twenty-nine percent of immigrants either
agreed to be removed or were ordered removed at these hearings, a re-
markably large number considering that these were not hearings on the
merits, but rather Master Calendar hearings: a preliminary hearing intended
to explain the charges, enter a plea, ensure representation by counsel, and
set a date for a final hearing.  For those immigrants without attorneys at
their Master Calendar hearings, a stunning forty-four percent were ordered
removed or agreed to be removed before reaching a hearing on the mer-
its.88
These problems were even worse for immigrants who did not under-
stand English.  Twelve percent of all observed immigrants had comprehen-
sion problems due to the insufficient interpretation.  The report found that
“[o]bservers consistently reported that most of what was said at the hearing
 85. Id.
 86. Id.
 87. AMANDA J. GRANT ET AL., VIDEOCONFERENCING IN REMOVAL HEARINGS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE CHICAGO IMMIGRATION COURT, LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUND. METROPOLITAN CHI. & CH I.
APPLESEED FUND FOR JUST. 5-7 (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.lafchicago.org/complete%20report.pdf.
 88. Id.
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was not translated for immigrants, even when immigrants did not have
legal representation.  It must be assumed that many immigrants who de-
pended on interpreters had no idea of what was happening in their cases.”
Not surprisingly, seventy-six percent of non-English speaking Latinos
were removed, as opposed to forty-six percent of English speaking Lati-
nos.89
Other observers witnessed proceedings that seem to confirm what the
studies presented above indicate—that it is more difficult to emotionally
connect with other people over videoconference than in person.  One re-
searcher observed the following at one hearing:
[The immigrant] was sobbing.  She looked like she was a teenager.
No one even noticed how stressed out she was.  Everyone was sta-
pling exhibits and passing papers, and then it was over . . . .  No
one explained why [the case] was being continued.  Her usual at-
torney wasn’t there.  It seems like her condition might have had
more of an impact had she been in the courtroom, but no one even
noticed her.90
Finally, lack of representation also exacerbated the problems with vid-
eoconference hearings: fully forty-four percent of observed immigrants
without representation were removed, compared to only seventeen percent
of those with representation.  These findings, taken together, indicate that
equipment often does not function properly at these hearings, and, even
when it does, it often fails to ensure a fair hearing.91
Given the clear and well-documented effect of media technology on
message, the importance of NVC, and the way media distorts NVC, there
is strong reason to believe that videoconference trials will damage the fair-
ness of immigration removal proceedings.  Many studies show that the
distortion of NVC impairs the ability of aliens to express emotion, to con-
nect with the judge, to be trusted and believed, to form a positive impres-
sion, and even to be understood.  The next Part will examine how these
effects emerge from proceedings that violate the due process rights of the
aliens
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS
The previous Part showed that current communications and psychol-
ogy research strongly indicates that videoconference trials are fundamen-
 89. Id. at 7-8, 44.
 90. Id. at 46.
 91. Id. at 51.
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tally different and inferior—from the perspective of the respondent—to
ordinary live trials.  These differences result from a process that threatens
three important rights that are fundamental to our conception of justice: the
right of presence; the right to confront one’s accusers; and the right to
counsel.
A.  The Right of Presence
Historically, the right of the government to deport aliens had been seen
as nearly absolute,92 but now a removal order requires a meaningful hear-
ing on the issues,93 which is understood to include the protections of pro-
cedural due process under the Fifth Amendment.94  The United States Su-
preme Court considers three factors in determining whether procedural due
process has been met: the private interest affected by the action; the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of that interest; and the government’s interest in
the efficient administration of justice.95  Fundamentally, due process is “the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner.’”96
There has long been a due process right to be present at a criminal trial
where one’s life or liberty is at stake.97  This right was most recently con-
firmed in 2004, when the United States Supreme Court ruled that state
courthouses must be handicap-accessible to ensure that disabled defendants
are afforded the right to be present at all important stages of their trial.98  It
is less clear if this right also applies in the civil context.
In civil cases in which fundamental issues like an individual’s life or
liberty is at stake, however, this right is more likely to apply.  For example,
in Specht v. Patterson,99 the United States Supreme Court upheld the right
to be present during involuntary civil commitment proceedings.  Likewise,
the Court has upheld the right to be present during proceedings over social
security payments, an issue of vital importance to many people.100
Immigration proceedings would seem to be ones where decisions cru-
cial to an individual’s life and liberty are made.  Though this issue has not
 92. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a nation to expel or
deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the
country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entrance into the country.”).
 93. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-02 (1903).
 94. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
 95. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
 96. Id. at 333 (citation omitted).
 97. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1884).
 98. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532-33 (2004).
 99. 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
 100. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696-97 (1979).
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explicitly been addressed by the courts, there are indications that they con-
sider the right of presence part of due process in this context.  In 1989, in
Purba v. INS,101 the Ninth Circuit overturned a deportation order given
after a hearing conducted by telephone, ruling that deportation proceedings
had to be in the “physical presence” of a judge.  This ruling appeared to be
based solely on statutory interpretation, and the relevant statute was altered
in 1996 to explicitly allow immigration proceedings by “video conference”
with or without the alien’s consent,102 or by “telephone conference” with
the alien’s consent.103
As recently as last year, however, the Ninth Circuit held that Purba
had a constitutional dimension as well, finding that it stood for the propo-
sition that “due process requires physical presence in deportation hear-
ings.”104  At least one dissenting opinion in an immigration court proceed-
ing has cited Purba for the proposition that due process demands the
alien’s presence at his hearing.  Immigration Judge Lory Rosenberg, dis-
senting in In re Lei,105 wrote,
The right to be present at one’s deportation hearing arises from the
statutory language and from due process considerations that in-
volve issues of personal liberty.  It also is related to the concern for
reliability in deportation proceedings, which often involve highly
complex facts regarding a respondent’s attributes and activities and
require the respondent's testimony to properly adjudicate the
case.106
The notion that videoconferencing is inadequate to meet the presence
requirements of due process in the civil context has won further support in
recent years from rulings by the Seventh, Tenth, and Fourth Circuits.  In
2005, in Thornton v. Snyder,107 the petitioner filed a civil rights claim in
the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois protest-
ing his prison conditions.  After losing in a videoconference hearing at the
district court level, he appealed to the Seventh Circuit on the grounds that
the nature of the trial violated his due process.108
The court ruled that the decision to conduct the trial by videoconfer-
ence was at the discretion of the district court, and, in this case, the court
 101. 884 F.2d 516, 516 (9th Cir. 1989).
 102. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).
 103. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000); 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(2)(B) (2000).
 104. United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005).
 105. 22 I & N Dec. 113, 1998 WL 422061 (1998).
 106. Id. at *121 (Rosenberg, J., dissenting).
 107. 428 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005).
 108. Id.
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did not abuse that discretion.109  The appellate court pointed out that the
petitioner was considered to be “an extremely high escape risk” with a
“moderate aggression level” already serving a life sentence, and his physi-
cal presence would require the accompaniment of two prison guards.110
Despite this decision, the court emphasized the drawbacks of videoconfer-
ence trials.111  Specifically, it commented:
Clearly, a jury trial conducted by videoconference is not the same
as a trial where the witnesses testify in the same room as the jury.
Videoconference proceedings have their shortcomings  . . . .  “The
immediacy of a living person is lost” with video technology.
“Video conferencing . . . is not the same as actual presence, and it
is to be expected that the ability to observe demeanor, central to
the fact-finding process, may be lessened in a particular case by
video conferencing.  This may be particularly detrimental where it
is a party to the case who is participating by video conferencing,
since personal impression may be a crucial factor in persuasion.” .
. . .  The limitations videoconferencing presents demonstrate that
the decision to deny a prisoner the opportunity to be physically
present at a civil rights trial he initiates is not one that should be
taken lightly.112
While the court found videoconferencing acceptable based on the facts in
Thornton, it is unclear how the Seventh Circuit would react in a case where
the petitioner did not appear as dangerous, or in response to the systematic
and undifferentiated use of videoconferencing in immigration courts today.
In United States v. Torres-Pahena,113 the Tenth Circuit ruled that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 43, requiring that a defendant be “present”
during his sentencing,114 requires physical presence, and therefore it was
illegal to conduct the sentencing hearing via videoconference.  The court
performed a close textual analysis, using definitions of “present” from the
Oxford English Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary.115  The Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the former defines “present” as “the state of being before,
beside, with or in the same place as the person to whom the word has rela-
tion,” while the later defines it as “in attendance, not elsewhere.”116  While
not directly applicable to administrative hearings like immigration, this
 109. Id.
 110. Id. at 693.
 111. Id. at 697-98.
 112. Id. at 697-98 (citations omitted).
 113. 290 F.3d 1244, 1245 (10th Cir. 2002).
 114. FED. R. CIV. P. 43.
 115. Torres-Pahena, 290 F.3d at 1247.
 116. Id.
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case strengthens the view that the due process presence requirement de-
mands actual presence.
The Fourth Circuit, widely considered the most conservative and pro-
government of the federal appellate courts, has also appeared skeptical of
videoconferencing.  Specifically addressing the use of this technology in
immigration courts, the Fourth Circuit held,
Regardless of how rapidly technological improvements, such as
videoconferencing, may advance, the Government remains obliged
to ensure that asylum petitioners are accorded a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard before their cases are determined.  In this re-
gard, the procedures utilized in [petitioner’s] hearing could have
resulted in the denial of a full and fair hearing on his claim.  The
utilization of video conferencing, although enhancing the efficient
conduct of the judicial and administrative process, also has the
potential of creating certain problems in adjudicative proceedings.
As Chief Judge Wilkinson has appropriately observed, “virtual re-
ality is rarely a substitute for actual presence and . . . even in an
age of advancing technology, watching an event on the screen re-
mains less than the complete equivalent of actually attending it.”117
This appeal was rejected because the petitioner failed to show he had been
prejudiced by the potential due process violation.118  Nevertheless, the fact
that a court as conservative as the Fourth Circuit questioned the ability of
videoconferencing to provide the kind of presence demanded by due proc-
ess is noteworthy.  Videoconferencing denies respondents their due process
right to be present in court when matters of great importance to their lives
are being adjudicated.
B.  The Right of Confrontation
The right of a defendant to confront the witnesses and evidence against
him has long been part of the Western legal tradition.  Though dating from
Roman times, its common law origins are often found in the 1603 trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh for treason, which made frequent use of ex parte testi-
mony.119  In the United States, the right of confrontation, considered “one
of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,”120 was enshrined in most
 117. Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
 118. Id. at 324.
 119. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004).
 120. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
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states through constitutions or declarations of rights,121 and in the Sixth
Amendment.122
The right of confrontation has been extended to immigration proceed-
ings.  Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien in a deportation
proceeding must be given “a reasonable opportunity . . . to cross-examine
witnesses presented by the government.”123  In Bridges v. Wixon,124 for
example, an alien filed a habeus corpus petition protesting a deportation
order that was based on ex parte statements that he was a member of the
Communist Party and advocated the overthrowing of the government.  The
Supreme Court overturned the deportation order on the grounds that the
use of such statements was prejudicial and violated his right to a fair hear-
ing.125
More recently, in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v.
Reno,126 the Ninth Circuit overturned deportation orders against members
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.  In Reno, the govern-
ment made extensive use of secret, undisclosed evidence to find that these
individuals belonged to an organization that advocates world communism.
The Ninth Circuit found it an “immutable principle” that the government’s
evidence must be disclosed in adversary proceedings so that individuals
have an opportunity to disprove the government’s case against them.127
The court found that secret evidence posed an “exceptionally high risk of
erroneous deprivation” of due process because it deprived individuals of
their right to confrontation.128
Of course, the government will claim that the videoconference medium
allows the respondent to cross-examine witnesses and be confronted with
the evidence against him, thus satisfying his right to confrontation.  But,
there are numerous precedents establishing the proposition that the right to
confrontation demands a face-to-face meeting with the judge and wit-
nesses.129
In early cases, it was found that the right to confrontation could even
be violated by courtroom layouts or conditions that blocked the defen-
dant’s view of the jury or witness.  Thus, in Herbert v. Superior Court,130 a
 121. Id. at 48.
 122. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
 123. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3) (2000).
 124. 326 U.S. 135, 138-40 (1945).
 125. Id. at 156-57.
 126. 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d in part, 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
 127. Id. at 1069.
 128. Id. at 1069-71.
 129. See generally Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Conditions Interfering with Accused’s View of
Witness as Violation of Right of Confrontation, 19 A.L.R. 4TH 1286 (2005).
 130. 117 Cal. App. 3d 661 (1981).
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conviction for committing lewd acts upon a child was overturned because
the judge devised a seating arrangement that prevented the defendant from
seeing the complainant when she testified.  In State v. Weldon,131 a murder
conviction was overturned because court overcrowding prevented the de-
fendant from seeing the jury and witnesses.  In State v. Mannion,132 a con-
viction for assault with intent to commit rape was overturned because the
defendant was ordered to sit in the back of the courtroom where he could
not see or hear the witnesses.  These cases stand for the proposition that the
right to confrontation is violated, even when the defendant is in the same
room, if he is denied the opportunity to confront his accusers face-to-face.
The principal of confrontation has often been extended to closed-
circuit witness testimony.  In recent years, with mounting concerns about
the emotional and psychological impact on abused children of testifying in
front of their abusers, courts have been more willing to allow CCTV testi-
mony in child sex abuse trials.  Cognizant of the defendant’s right of con-
frontation, however, courts typically require an individualized finding that
CCTV is merited in a particular case despite the undeniably compelling
state interest in protecting children.  These particular findings stand in stark
contrast to the systematic, undifferentiated use of videoconference pro-
ceedings in immigration court, where the state interest of efficiency is not
nearly as compelling.
In Maryland v. Craig,133 for example, the Supreme Court ruled that
although the confrontation right is not absolute, that “does not . . . mean
that it may easily be dispensed with.”134  Rather, “a defendant’s right to
confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-
face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is neces-
sary to further an important public policy.”135  The Court went on to en-
dorse Maryland’s law allowing for CCTV in child sex abuse cases, “given
the State’s traditional and ‘transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of
children,’ and buttressed by the growing body of academic literature
documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims
who must testify in court.”136  Yet, even given this overwhelming state
interest, the Court insisted that “the requisite finding of necessity must of
course be a case-specific one.”137
 131. 74 S.E. 43, 45-46 (S.C. 1912).
 132. 57 P. 542 (Utah 1899).
 133. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
 134. Id. at 850.
 135. Id.
 136. Id. at 855 (citation omitted).
 137. Id.
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Craig138 involves a compelling state interest—the emotional and psy-
chological health of abused children—yet demands a case-by-case finding
of necessity to overcome the defendant’s confrontation right.  The far less
compelling interest of efficiency claimed by the state in the immigration
context, as the policy is presently implemented, does not even require such
a particularized finding to overcome the alien’s fundamental right to per-
sonally confront his accusers and the witnesses against him.
C.  The Right to Counsel
The right to counsel is a fundamental right of our justice system,139 en-
shrined in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.140
Though the Sixth Amendment does not apply in immigration proceed-
ings,141 aliens are understood to have a right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process clause,142 as well as by statute.143  During im-
migration videoconference proceedings, typically the respondent is in one
location, the government attorney in another location—the official court-
room—and the judge in a third location.  The respondent’s attorney, there-
fore, has a difficult decision to make: whether her presence is more valu-
able near the judge, near her client, or in the courtroom.  In reality, many
immigration lawyers, especially legal aid and pro bono attorneys, do not
have the time or resources to be in the judge’s chambers, which are often
in another state, or in the respondent’s detention facility, which may also
be in another state.  Ordinarily, therefore, the attorney is in the courtroom.
Naturally, this makes communication with her client extremely diffi-
cult.  It is hard for these immigration lawyers to communicate confiden-
tially with their clients during the day of the trial because they can only
speak through the videoconference system.  The government attorney may
be in the room with them at the time, and even if he is not, there may be
people in either the judge’s location or the detention facility who could
overhear.  Furthermore, they do not know if the conversation is being re-
corded by the video equipment, and, if so, what will be done with the re-
cordings.
 138. The many other federal and state court cases that follow this line of reasoning are far too numer-
ous to go into here.  See Annotation, Closed-Circuit Television Witness Examination, 61 A.L.R. 4TH
1155 (2005).
 139. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
 140. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.”).
 141. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
 142. Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985).
 143. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1362 (2000).
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In an ordinary trial, the client can meet with his attorney before and
after the proceedings, during breaks, and can whisper to her during the trial
itself.  This all becomes either impossible or extremely difficult during
videoconference proceedings.  For legal aid and pro bono attorneys, who
may not have the time or resources to visit with their clients in distant de-
tention centers, trial days are some of the few opportunities they have to
meet with their clients.  Videoconference trials seriously diminish the abil-
ity of aliens to receive the assistance of counsel that they deserve.
V. HOW VIDEOCONFERENCING TECHNOLOGY SHOULD BE USED
This Part presents ways to mitigate the negative effects of this new
technology in the courtroom, and catalogs some positive uses of the tech-
nology for the legal profession in the immigration context.
A.  Recommendations to Mitigate the Negative Effects
1.  Use videoconferencing technology exclusively for procedural
hearings, while conducting substantive hearings live.
The worst effects of closed-circuit hearings fall on a defendant’s abil-
ity to tell her story to the court, confront her accusers, and make use of
counsel.  For Master Calendar hearings in which substantive decisions are
not made and testimony is not given, these effects do not pose nearly as
much of a problem.  Using videoconferencing technology exclusively for
procedural hearings, however, would require a greater commitment from
the government not to make substantive decisions during these hearings.
2.  Provide a reliable, confidential means of communication between
the respondent and his attorney when separated.
If the respondent is in one location, such as a detention center, and the
attorney in another location, like the courtroom, the government should
provide a dedicated telephone line and private rooms in both locations to
ensure the respondent has access to communicate privately with his attor-
ney during trials.  This system would probably require a private room in
both the courthouse and detention center, away from the videoconferencing
technology, and a free direct telephone connection that the government
would agree not to listen in on.  Both the attorney and respondent should
be allowed to request a break during the hearing to make use of the tele-
phone when appropriate.
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3.  Do further study on the use of videoconferencing in the courtroom.
Surprisingly little research had been done on the impact of videocon-
ferencing technology on trials.  Many of the controlled studies by commu-
nication and behavioral experts do not perfectly replicate actual trials, and
many of them are inconclusive or contradictory.  With the possible excep-
tion of pilot programs for study purposes, the government should put a
moratorium on these trials until further study can be done, and conduct
comprehensive studies on this technology before a decision is made to go
forward on a broader scale.
4. Pay attention to how the system is set up.
One result of this study is the conclusion that the arrangement and de-
sign of the videoconferencing system is a big factor in what biases it pro-
motes.  Things like the camera angle, the sound system, the size of the
image, and the voice delay should be considered in detail when providing
regulation for how the system should be used.  Additionally, the govern-
ment should train court personnel how to use the new systems, and should
pay extra attention to providing reliable translation services for these
hearings.
B.  Beneficial Uses of Technology
1.  Attorney-Client Communication
Legal aids and other offices that serve poor clients should try to make
greater use of this technology when communicating with clients.  Many
clients are located in rural areas far away from the downtown locations of
most legal aids, and they often have difficulty traveling downtown because
they lack the means of transportation, the money, and/or the freedom to
miss work.  Particularly, legal aids are closing satellite offices for budget-
ary reasons, and this technology could be a useful means to communicate
with clients in a way that is less burdensome to them.  Videoconferencing
sites can be established in remote locations throughout the service area to
be closer to clients without the additional expense to legal aid of creating
full-fledged satellite offices.
2.  Reducing Paperwork and Bureaucracy
Many immigration functions, such as applications for permanent resi-
dency, naturalization, and visas, are bureaucratic and paperwork-intensive.
This takes up the time of the clients, attorneys, and government officials;
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slows down the process; and increases the likelihood of incomplete appli-
cations that must be revised.  Technology should be utilized to make these
processes easier and quicker, which would benefit all of the participants.
Many tasks can be automated and done over the Internet, and information
can be reutilized across documents to cut down on repeatedly providing the
same information in several different documents.  Automation would also
cut down on errors, which slow down the process even more, require addi-
tional work for all involved, and lead to frustration.
3.  Improving communication among legal aids
If major legal aids had videoconferencing technology, it would in-
crease their ability to communicate with one another.  This would allow for
more collaboration and information-sharing among legal aids across the
country.  In addition to sharing best practices in terms of operating and
administering such an organization, this would allow subject-area experts
to give advice to colleagues in other parts of the country.  For example, in
the immigration context, experts in immigrant-heavy areas like California
and Texas, could share their in-depth knowledge with colleagues in parts
of the country with fewer immigrants.  Furthermore, colleagues around the
country could work together on national priorities; share local experiences
and initiatives that could be applied elsewhere; or share special programs
or seminars they have prepared with colleagues elsewhere.
VI. CONCLUSION
The idea that the medium is the message—that form can overtake
content in communicating meaning—seems particularly resonant in to-
day’s immigration court.  As important nonverbal cues are distorted, im-
migrants lose their chance to make their case in subtle but important
ways—less emotional connection, more negative impressions, weaker
credibility.  These effects help us understand why traditional principles,
like rights of presence, confrontation, and counsel, are so ingrained in our
conception of justice and why we must protect them.
In discussing the drawbacks of a technological innovation, we run the
risk of looking like Luddites, as those who are so stuck in the old ways that
they are blind to new and better ways of doing things.  But by abandoning
the process of the traditional trial in the name of efficiency, we may imper-
ceptibly be losing something of great value.  The elaborate and seemingly
outdated safeguards afforded the accused—to look his accuser in the eye,
to be physically present in the courtroom—may serve important, inarticu-
lable purposes not only for the accused but for society as well, in affirming
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our values and our notions of justice.  The trial process itself, with its ritu-
alistic airs, may impose a certain discipline and education on all its partici-
pants.  If nothing else, an immigration trial should proceed with a dignity
that matches the gravity of the occasion—an occasion that threatens the
loss of an individual’s health, happiness, livelihood, family, and of “all that
makes life worth living.”144  It is this intuitive sense that, in the name of
efficiency, we are imperceptibly but decisively departing from long-held
beliefs and traditions—beliefs and traditions that have subtle but important
effects on our legal system and society—that makes these hearings so un-
settling for so many people.
In 1971, Professor Laurence Tribe wrote an article in the Harvard Law
Review about the role of mathematics in law.145  In that article, he discusses
the importance of legal process, independent of achieving certain out-
comes.  He wrote,
Rules of trial procedure in particular have importance largely as
expressive entities and only in part as means of influencing inde-
pendently significant conduct and outcomes.  Some of those rules,
to be sure, reflect only an “arid ritual of meaningless form,” but
others express profoundly significant moral relationships and prin-
ciples—principles too subtle to be translated into anything less
complex than the intricate symbolism of the trial process.  Far
from being either barren or obsolete, much of what goes on in the
trial of a lawsuit—particularly in a criminal case—is partly cere-
monial or ritualistic in this deeply positive sense, and partly edu-
cational as well; procedure can serve a vital role as conventional-
ized communication among a trial’s participants, and as something
like a reminder to the community of the principles it holds impor-
tant.  The presumption of innocence, the rights to counsel and con-
frontation, the privilege against self-incrimination, and a variety of
other trial rights, matter not only as devices for achieving or
avoiding certain kinds of trial outcomes, but also as affirmations of
respect for the accused as a human being—affirmations that re-
mind him and the public about the sort of society we want to be-
come and, indeed, about the sort of society we are.146
While videoconference hearings may bring certain efficiencies, we could
lose these moral benefits of process that bring humanity and dignity to our
justice system.
 144. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (Brandeis, J.).
 145. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1329 (1971).
 146. Id. at 1391-92.
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Thurman Arnold, a former professor at Yale Law School and judge on
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals who was most famous as a trust-busting
assistant attorney general in the Franklin Roosevelt administration, be-
lieved that the complicated and seemingly inefficient nature of trials were
necessary in order to embody our sense of justice and that attempts to find
short cuts around them would slowly undermine the core values of our
society.  He wrote,
A trial by due process is [such] a cumbersome and inefficient way
of investigating facts. . . .  [Because] like the human personality it
must keep in balance all sorts of conflicting ideals.  And over them
all, keeping each contradictory social attitude in its proper place,
there must be spread the philosophy of justice.  That philosophy
can never be defined. . . .  The only way that it can become real
and make itself felt is by the ceremony of a trial by due process of
law . . . .  The ideal that every man is entitled to a fair and impartial
trial is the cornerstone of civilized government.  Before this ideal
every consideration of efficiency in government administration
must give way. . . .  The American trial is our only public cere-
mony which symbolizes the idea that the rights of the individual
are superior to the convenience or even the security of the sover-
eign.147
The complications and inconveniences of our trials, though seemingly rel-
ics of antiquated traditions, embody our values in ways that would be lost
in the search for quicker and easier ways of doing things.
In this era of virtual reality, we convince ourselves that the human
touch is no longer important, that the electronic image is equivalent to the
beating heart.  But the evidence tells a different story—of trust that is un-
dermined, of image that is distorted, and of emotions that fail to resonate.
These distortions result from and are evidence of the denial of basic proce-
dural rights—presence, confrontation, and counsel—that are inherent to the
live trial of our legal tradition and to the individual facing the judge and
pleading his case.  These distortions violate our notions of justice, fairness,
and the dignity of human life.  Before we expand even more the use of
videoconferencing in our justice system, we should step back and consider
the full implications of this policy for the immigrants and for ourselves.
Trials by videoconference undoubtedly save the government’s resources,
but in our rush to save time and money, we may be losing something far
more valuable.
 147. Thurman Arnold, Due Process in Trials, in 300 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 123-24 (1955) (alterations in original).
